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This paper investigates Palestine’s institutional foundations in order to decide on the most 
appropriate telecommunications regulatory system. It is based on the work of Levy and 
Spiller’s institutional endowment framework. Comments and adjustments to the 
framework are also discussed and regulation within fragile states is also analyzed. 
 
Depending on international reports and interviews with key stakeholders of the 
telecommunications sector, the paper present Palestine’s institutional endowment 
framework in addition to adjustments needed to accommodate fragility and occupation. 
 
JEL codes: L96 or Z00 
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1. Introduction	
Institutions played a significant role in implementing recent telecommunications regulatory 
reforms. Issues such as regulatory independence, accountability, transparency, clarity, conflict 
resolution, and right of appeal were emphasized in regulatory frameworks that aimed at better 
performance of the telecommunications sector through introducing competition, attracting entry 
and investment, and promoting public confidence in the sector. 
 
As a result, telecommunications regulatory authorities were established (or reformed) with a 
mandate and a degree of independence employing a set of regulatory best practices such as 
accountability, transparency, and efficiency to protect consumers’ interests, promote and 
maintain competition, prevent abuse of market power, and create a favorable investment climate. 
 
Establishment of telecommunications regulatory authorities and the ability of such authorities to 
effectively regulate the market depended on the institutional endowment and experience of the 
country itself. Countries with solid institutional experience, established rule of law, high degree 
of accountability and transparency, and independent Judiciary found it easier to establish a 
regulatory authority; and the authority found it smoother to operate within such enabling 
environment. On the other hand, countries with limited or nonexistent institutional experience 
found it hard to establish a regulatory authority; and the authority faced many difficulties in 
stamping its authority and autonomy. 
 
In their attempt to implement best regulatory practices, most developing countries copied 
telecommunications regulatory frameworks of developed countries. However, developing 
countries focused more on the structure of regulatory authorities, and paid little attention to 
prerequisites necessary to support their work such as independent Judiciary, strong rule of law, 
and regulatory values such as autonomy, accountability, and transparency. This resulted in a 
practice that is far different from what has been written in the law. 
 
As a result, regulators lacked necessary regulatory commitment because governments can exert 
pressure on them to modify or overturn decisions, especially highly politicized issue such as 
tariff setting. Such pressure is applied in different forms, such as removal of regulatory 
authority’s heads (either board or executive manager) from position, staff appointment, or budget 
setting. For example, the Electricity Regulatory Board in Kenya has witnessed 5 Chairmen in six 
years. 
 
The story is not different in the Palestinian Territory. There is a great gap between law and 
practice. Since its establishment in 1995, the Palestinian Authority has been ridden with 
corruption, nepotism, and ineffectiveness. All its institutions have failed to deliver.  
 
 In August 2009, the Palestinian Authority announced a 2 year plan to build institutions that are 
capable of efficient performance to support establishment of an independent state. Almost 
simultaneously, the PA President signed the 2009 Telecommunications Law that establishes an 
independent regulatory authority. The law has been effective since the Palestinian Legislative 
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 Council has been paralyzed. Nonetheless, political parties’ representatives announced that their 
parties will reject the law once the Council is back to function
2.  
 
However, accountability, transparency, and rule of law have been fragile since the establishment 
of the Palestinian Authority in mid 1990s, and Judiciary is not independent. Establishing a 
telecommunications regulatory authority within such environment shall most likely lead to a 
weak institution with limited autonomy to provide effective regulations. 
 
This paper uses Levy & Spiller’s institutional endowment framework as a reference for the best 
regulatory system that is compliant with Palestine’s institutional endowment. The remaining of 
this paper consists of the following: Section 2 presents research question and methodology, 
section 3 discusses Spiller and Levy’s institutional endowment framework, section 4 describes 
Palestine’s institutional endowment, section 5 suggests adjustments to be made on the 




This paper attempts to answer the following question: how does the institutional endowment 




To answer the research question, this paper follows a qualitative research approach. First, it 
examines the institutional endowment framework set by Levy & Spiller (1994) and Levy & 
Spiller (1996) It also presents comments and criticism for the framework and incorporates new 
developments on institutional capacity related to unstable states. 
 
Second, it presents the current institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority. Data is 
collected via governmental and international reports that track institutional developments in the 
Palestinian Authority.  
 
Finally, interviews with key stakeholders in the telecommunications sector are conducted to take 
note of stakeholders’ perception of institutional foundations and experience’s importance on 
telecommunications regulation and the creation of an effective and independent 
telecommunications regulatory authority. Interviewers consist of:  
 
  A representative of the Ministry of Telecommunications Information Technology 
  A representative of the incumbent operator (fixed, mobile, data) – Paltel 
  A representative the second mobile operator – Wataniya Palestine 
  Two representatives of Newly licensed providers of broadband Internet, VoIP, and Wi-Fi 
  A representative of Palestinian IT Association of Companies 
                                                 
2 The constitution states that any laws signed by the President during which the Legislative Council is inactive for 
whatever reason, are still in need for approval from the Council, and shall be presented to the Council on its first 
session after returning to function. 
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   A representative of Internet Society, Palestine chapter – ISOC.PS 
  An expert involved in discussions regarding the 2009 Telecommunications Law 
 
3. The	institutional	endowment	Framework	
In 1994, Levy and Spiller presented their institutional endowment framework, which is based on 
a comparative study for five countries (Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, Philippines, and the UK) to 
determine whether liberalization of the telecommunications sector could be attainable under 
different institutional environments. Levy & Spiller (1994) proposition is straightforward; 
looking at regulation as a contractual problem, the specific characteristics of 
telecommunications
3 may lead to governments’ attempts of administrative exploitation to 
achieve short-term political gains
4 and extract operator’s quasi-rents. 
 
Administrative exploitation varies from setting prices below the long-run average cost, specific 
requirements concerning investment, equipment purchases, and labor contract rents.  The degree 
of administrative exploitation depends on the country’s political and social institutions and their 
interaction with regulatory process. The contractual problem becomes a regulatory design
5 
problem, where the effectiveness and credibility of a country’s regulatory framework (its ability 
to attract private investment) varies with its political and social institutions.  
 
Therefore, operators’ performance can be satisfactory if institutions are able to restrain 
administrative exploitation. Levy & Spiller (1994, p. 202) defines three machanisms to restrain 
arbitrary admnstrative explitation: 1) Substantive restrainst on the discretion of the regulator, 2) 
formal or informal constraints on changing the regulatory system, and 3) institutions that enforce 
the formal/informal constraints.  
 
Institutions’ ability to put in place these mechanisms depends on the country’s institutional 
endowment, which consist of five elements (Levy and Spiller, 1994, page 206): 
 
1.  Country’s legislative and executive institutions; which are the formal mechanisms for 
a.  appointing legislators and decision-makers and for making laws and regulations 
b.  implementing these laws that determine the relationship between legislators and 
executive 
2.  Country’s judicial institutions for 
a.  Appointing judges and determining internal structure of the judiciary 
b.  Impartially resolving disputes among private parties or between private parties 
and the state 
3.  Customs and other informal broadly accepted norms that can be used as constraints on 
individual or institutions actions 
                                                 
3 Economies of scale and scope, sunk assets, and broad range of domestic demand. (Levy and Spiller, 1994, page 
203) 
4 Such as lowering local call prices, better labor conditions, etc. 
5 Regulatory design is a combination of regulatory governance (mechanisms that society uses to constrain regulatory 
discretion) and regulatory incentive (rules governing utility pricing, cross or direct subsidies, entry, interconnection, 
etc.) Levy and Spiller (1994, page 205) 
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 4.  The character of the conceding social interests within a society and the balance between 
them 
5.  Administrative capabilities of the nation 
 
Therefore, regulatory design (governance and incentives) should be compliant with the country’s 
own institutional endowment. An unstable country, in that sense, may not be able to effectively 
import the telecommunications regulatory framework of the UK, because it does not have the 
same institutional endowment of the UK in terms of an independent judiciary, a proper system of 
checks and balances, etc.  
 
The institutional endowment framework formulates a decision tree that defines type of regulatory 




Source (Levy and Spiller, 1996, page 8) 
 
Not only institutional endowment affects regulatory design, but also it plays an important role in 
private firms’ decision to enter the market. For example, the authors put an emphasis first on the 
country’s ability to produce an independent judiciary system because lack of independent 
judiciary would drive private participation away since the risk of arbitrary administrative 
exploitation would be high, and private firms would not be able to guarantee an impartial dispute 
resolution. (Levy and Spiller 1994, page 210) Therefore, with lack of international guarantees as 
a possible safeguard, public utilities, including telecommunications in unstable states would be in 
better position under public ownership. 
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3.1  Additions	and	comments	on	the	framework	
(Cherry & Wildman, 1999) and (Stirton & Lodge, 2002) have addressed the institutional 
endowment framework. While Cherry and Wildman (1999, page 608) aim was to match 
restrictions on regulatory discretion founded in the US constitution and those of the framework, 
Lindsay and Lodge (2002, page 3) took a further step and attempted to assess whether Levy and 
Spiller framework is supported by empirical data after 15 years of the initial framework. Their 
main criticism of the framework lies with two main points. 
 
First, the framework provides a narrow view of the goals of regulation by looking at regulation 
as a contractual problem and concentrating on economic goals over other societal and non-
economic ones. The main objection here is that while such narrow view would be true in 
developed countries, where social goals such as universal service obligations and consumer 
protection could be attained if economic objectives are met (Nenova, 2007, page 70), this is not 
the case in developed countries, where societal goals gian more importance and affects the level 
of tradeoff between equity and effecincy. 
 
Second, and more importantly, the framework overlooks research in regulation that points out to 
two major sources of corrupting influnces; political institutions (i.e. the executive) and social 
colective action (i.e. capture). While private investors do seek gurantees that goverments would 
not renge on their promises, network industries has been dominated with monopolies that have 
high degree of inflence on policies. 
 
To that effect, the Jamican experience on liberlization provides different explination than what 
the framework initial hypothesis proposes that is the fight between the Jamican governmnt and 
the private monopoly C&W does not present the hypothsis of governments trying to exploit the 
private investment, but rather such fight was essential for liberlization of the sector while the 
government still honoring C&W exlusivity agreement. (Stirton & Lodge, 2002, page 9) 
 
Due to the above observations, and based on analytical interpretation of developments in 
Jamican telecommunications sector, the authors proposes three possible interpretations to Levy 
and Spiller’s framework. First, the framwork has been faulsified by such developments. Second, 
the framerok is correct, but the Jamican new telecommunications ACT of 2000 and susequent 
regulatory reforms were “ill-advised mismatch.” Third, Jamica’s institutional endowment has 
changed, resulted in strenghtened capacity and greater autonomy of its adminstration, both in 
telecommunications and in general. Authors end up with thrid interpretation as the most 
reosanable one. 
 
Choosing the third option as the most reasonable interpretation contribute actually to the validity 
of the framework as it shows that strengthening institutional capacity does, indeed, affect quality 
of regulations. The only critisim left within this option is the long exclusivity clause (25 years in 
the framework) that is given to a private firm, while institutional reform and strenghtening of 
institutional endowmwnt took only 10 years! Nontheless, validity of the framework is 
strenghtened. 
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 3.2  Within	the	context	of	unstable	states	
Cherry & Wildman (1999) and Stirton & Lodge (2002) discussed the framework within stable 
countries with independent judiciary and stable governments (unified or otherwise). However, 
attention to unstable States has not been mentioned, which the original framework includes in the 
case of the Phillipines. 
 
3.2.1  What	is	unstable	States?	
The term “unstable State” can include a wide set of countries according to different 
categorizations. The term is usually substituted or associated with terms “Ineffective State“, 
“Fragile State” and “Falling State”. According to OECD (2008, p. 2), “States are fragile when 
state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for 
poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their 
populations” 
 
The above definition is applicable to a wide set of countries that have different causes of fragility 
such as war, political instability, etc
6. OECD (2008, p. 7) focuses the discussion of fragile States 
with respect to social contracts. It recognizes that stability of a state is reached through 
negotiations between the state and its citizens over delivery of basic services taking into 
consideration the state’s capacity. Once reached an agreement (or equilibrium), the state and its 
citizens enter a social contract that provides stability. Thus, stability or fragility is a result of 
“weaknesses in the dynamic process through which citizens’ expectations of the state and state’s 
expectations of citizens are reconciled and brought into equilibrium with the state’s capacity to 
deliver services.” Failing to reach equilibrium is a critical determinant of fragility. 
 
Social contracts are determined by several factors, including (OECD, 2008, p. 18) : 
 
  expectations that a given society has of a given state 
  state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its 
population and territory to provide these services 
  élite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfill social expectations 
  the existence of political processes through which the bargain between state and society 
is struck, reinforced and institutionalized 
  legitimacy plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations and facilitating 
political process 
 
Failure of agreeing to one or a combination of the above could lead to fragility, so it’s not simple 
to determine which states will be fragile. In telecommunications context, failing a social contract 
would lead to weak regulation or even a situation where regulatory authorities do not have full 
control over the market. The following is an example to issues emerging from fragile states: 
 
  Kosovo: No international gateways are assigned to Kosovo. Regulatory authorities use 
Serbian and Slovenian international gateways. (Cullen International, 2010) 
                                                 
6 Torres and Anderson (2004, page 5) list State collapse, loss of territorial control, low administrative capacity, 
political instability, Neo-Patrimonial politics, conflict, and repressive polities as source of diverse causes and 
symptoms of ineffective States. 
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   West Bank and Gaza (Palestinian Territory): Bulk of core network (switches) are hosted 
outside the territory; spectrum allocation is controlled by Israeli authorities; imported 
equipment takes lots of times (years) for security clearance. (World Bank, 2008) 
  Somalia: Six mobile operators, each covering a geographic region due to civil war
7 
  Arab countries: Absence of adequate appeal process and ownership of ruling 




Problems of fragile states are mainly institutional. Fragile states suffer from limited resources 
and close relationships between political elite and businesses that are discussed above. In 
addition, fragile states suffer from the lack of political will and capacity and poor public sector 




Strong political will or commitment and capacity is needed for effective regulations. According 
to Brown et al (2006, p. 85), “an effective regulatory system requires both ‘commitment’ (will) 
and ‘capacity’ (ability to develop, implement, and honor polices, programs, and regulations) on 
the part of the government.” 
 
Therefore, States can create or import a telecommunications regulatory framework, but unless 
there is commitment from the government in legal process and enforcement, these frameworks 
will remain ineffective, and goals will not be achieved. 
 
Countries are categorized into four categories according to their political will and capacity: 
(Brown et al, 2006, p. 85) 
 
  Category 1: Strong and able. Countries with strong commitment and capacity. They have 
high probability of creating well-functioning and effective regulatory institutions without 
long delays; 
  Category 2: Weak and capable. Countries with weak commitment but strong capacity. 
They have adequate resources in terms of funding and/or expertise, but they lack the 
political will to initiate and enforce reforms; 
  Category 3: Strong and incapable. Countries with strong commitment but weak capacity. 
They have a political will to initiate necessary reforms, but they do not have the means 
(capacity) to implement and enforce these reforms; 
  Category 4: Weak and incapable. Countries with weak commitment and capacity. They 
have no or few functioning institutions, and they lack both political will to initiate 
reforms and means to implement and enforce them. 
 
Category 1consists of developed countries, while developing countries will be spread over 
category 2 and 3. Majority of fragile states are most likely to be found in category 4 with few in 
                                                 
7 http://developing-telecoms.blogspot.com/2009/07/somalia-while-daring-operators-turn.html 
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 category 3, where they might have a strong political well to reform, but they lack enough skilled 
labor to enforce regulation. (Brown et al, 2006, p. 88) 
 
When political will and capacity are low, adopting a telecommunications regulatory framework 
and establishing a regulatory authority becomes nothing more than a decoration. In such 
environment, inconsistent decisions would not be uncommon, and investors would view such 
States as a risky place to invest. 
 
Eberhard (2007, p. 1) has highlighted the issue of increased regulatory risk due to inconsistent 
regulatory decisions:  
 
“It was hoped that independent and accountable regulatory agencies would de-politicize 
tariff-setting and would improve the climate for operational management and private 
investment through more transparent and predictable decision-making….. These 
constraints, plus lack of capacity and experience, have resulted in many regulators 
making inconsistent and non-credible regulatory decisions that have created a new kind 
of risk for consumers, utilities, government, and investors, namely that of regulatory risk” 
 
What would make political will for reform low? According to Duckett (2001, p. 23), the new 
political economy (NPE) answer to this question is that governments resist attempts to reduce 
their control. The NPE suggests that politicians would be involved in interest-maximizing 
activities including economically damaging or wasteful government intervention such as 
purchasing support or accepting bribes in exchange for the distribution of subsidies, licenses, 
loans, jobs, or services. 
 
3.2.2.2  Poor	public	sector	performance	
Good public sector performance and service delivery is essential for the maintenance of the 
social contract discussed above and for the creation of public sector jobs. This requires that the 
public sector would have adequate financial resources in order to spend on essential services. 
The gap between fragile and stable states in public spending is significant. For example, average 
annual public sector spending per capita in OECD countries is above $10,000, while it does not 
go above $200 in fragile states. (Asian Development Bank, 2007, page 2) In addition to limited 
resources, corruption, poor governance, and weak institutions are considered the reason behind 
low public expenditure. (Asian Development Bank, 2006, p. 4) 
 
High level of corruption 
The Danish Institute for International Studies defines corruption as “abuse of public office for 
private gain” (DIIS, 2006, p. 1), while Transparency International
8 defines it as “misuse of 
entrusted power for private gain.” According to Damoni Kitabire, corruption is magnified in 
fragile states because, interalia, of the weak institutional framework and limited experienced 
labor and disregards of any provisions in the constitution
9. 
 
Holders of public offices usually fail to maintain a clear distinction between what is public and 
                                                 
8 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq 
9 Presentation on “Fighting corruption in a fragile state.” http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/58/39724765.pdf 
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 what is private, which leads to increased misuse of power. (DIIS, 2006, p. 1) In addition, new 
form of corruption is generated when the state decides on economic reforms and migrates from 
centrally planned to market-led economy. (Asian Development Bank, 2006, p. 4) According to 
Transparency International’s corruption index
10, fragile states such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq suffer from high levels of corruption. 
 
Weak rule of law 
(Winder, 2007) suggests that rule of law could be defined in three ways. The first definition 
provides a simplistic legal meaning that is “compliance with the laws as stated—adherence to 
statutes, whatever those may say.” The second definition requires that this sense of adherence 
should be translated, within a society, into a common respect for due process in a way that 
enables society to reach for an impartial resolution conflict mechanism such as an independent 
court, where rights such as the right to see charges and evidence, the right to offer defense, and 
the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty are guaranteed. The third definition adds 
to the previous two a requirement that laws should be just. Because of the difficulty in defining 
what a just law is, the third definition is the least used to define the rule of law. 
 
Domingo (2009, p. 131) argues that rule of law is critical to the legitimacy of governments. In 
that sense, rule of law becomes about a) the degree to which there is political will and 
institutional capacity to ensure accountable governments; b) the capacity of the state to protect 
and deliver the rights of citizens and; c) the state’s ability to enforce the law and protect its 
citizens through the provision of security against different forms of threat. 
 
According to Winder (2007, p. 2) and UNDP (2009, p. 2), problem with rule of law in fragile 
states are linked with a) corruption, in the sense that state officials view themselves as above the 
law; b) collapse of the political  community and institutions, which are the source of law or; c) 
common feeling of unjust laws among people. 
 
Therefore, building state’s institutions and combating corruption are two important tasks in order 
to restore the rule of law in fragile states. In particular, UNDP (2009, p. 2) suggests that 
developing the rule of law requires functioning courts, equal treatment before law, timely redress 
of grievances and effective institutions. Because of the limited resources of fragile states, most of 
reform initiatives are supported by the International community through several organizations 
such as UNDP, USAID, and the World Bank. 
4. Institutional	endowment	of	Palestine	
 
Palestine’s institutional endowment can be categorized with the likes of Argentina and the 
Philippines. It can be best described as a “Presidential rent-seeking” with a “political investment 
cycle.” The following provides a summary on the institutional endowment components 
 
                                                 
10 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results  
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 4.1  Judiciary	
Articles 97 and 98 of the Palestinian Constitution (Palestinian Authority, 2003) emphasize 
independence of the Judiciary and prohibit any other governmental branch from interfering with 
it. In reality, however, the judicial system has been corrupt. This is obvious on political-related 
trails. At best, security forces do not adhere to court orders or disregard procedures that require a 
court order, which reflects a general tendency of lack of respect for the law. Brown(2010, p. 4) 
notes that there is a gap between what’s written in the constitution and what’s been implemented: 
 
“The problem is that many of these more general promised developments are simply not 
occurring. There is no separation of powers; … Court orders have ignored; judges have 
bowed out of some sensitive political issues; and the independence of the judiciary is 
hardly guaranteed.” 
 
Effect on telecommunications 
Within telecommunications, there is almost no history of legal disputes. A major reason for that 
was the monopoly of Paltel over the sector and the close relationship they enjoyed with the 
government, especially during the first timeframe. However, since market liberalization started 
in 2006 new operators and service providers have entered the market. The need for an 
independent and adequate judicial system is apparent. None of the interviewed stakeholders see 
that, within its current state of capabilities, the judicial system can support the sector and help 
resolving possible disputes.  
 
While the issue of judiciary independence was a sensitive one, where some declined to comment 
and others maintained that for telecommunication-based cases Judiciary could be seen as 
independent, qualification and experience of the Judicial system to handle telecommunications 
cases carried more weight. For example, ISOC has an opinion that while the Judicial system is 
independent enough when it comes to pure commercial issues: 
 
“The problem of the judicial system is understanding the technical problems and 
implementing their decisions. That’s really is the problem, not independence, in my 
opinion” 
 
The independent expert has a similar opinion: 
“I don’t believe it’s totally independent. As it related to telecom I believe it is insufficient 
as well, and that’s something we have major discussions on. I don’t think that the existing 
judiciary system is up to card when dealing with telecom disputes, and it is one of major 
factors in looking at the regulatory body and see how successful it can be. Without a 
judiciary system just as technically at the regulatory body then disputes which are bound 
to happen would hit dead end. So that technical capacity (and I don’t mean engineering 
technical capacity, but technical capacity in terms of regulatory capacity) within the 
judiciary is key” 
However, there hasn’t been a single dispute between operators to examine the extent of lack of 
Page | 11  
 independence on telecommunications
11. What is of a more concern to the operators is the time 
taken to resolve a dispute in courts. Again, lack of expert judges that are able to understand 
telecommunications terminologies and apply the law comes to play. For example, Wataniya is on 
the opinion that current judicial system is under development in order to have a well-respected 
system. However, at current pace, Wataniya would be reluctant to settle a dispute through courts. 
 
“Because if Wataniya have a problem with Jawwal and I want to go to court right now 
and it will take 5-6 years to solve the problem, I [Wataniya] wouldn’t do that.” 
 
To overcome any possible dispute, companies rely on licenses issued by the ministry and service 
level agreements (SLAs) negotiated by companies when there is a need to access/interconnect. 
This reliance on licenses and SLAs is aligned with Spiller and Levy’s framework. 
 
4.2  Government	(Executive	and	Legislative)	
According to the Palestinian Constitution (2003, article 5), Palestine is Parlementary democratic 
system, where the people directly elect their President and representatives to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC). The government, is lead by a Prime Minister (usually leader of the 
majority) and confirmed by the Legislative Council. 
 
Through its relatively short history, the governance system of the Palestinian Authority (PA) can 
be categorized by three timeframes, the one-party ruling timeframe (1994 – 2006), dual-party 
timeframe (2006-2007), and the political split timeframe (2007-Present). During the first 
timeframe, the PA was dominated by Fatah, the leading political party in the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) that was responsible of the Oslo agreement
12. The first 
Presedintial and Parlementary elections resulted in Fatah securing a comfortable majority in the 
Legislative Council and Arafat, leader of both PLO and Fatah becoming the first Preseident of 
the PA. Relationship between the ligeslator and executive was smooth for the most part of that 
timeframe. A Fatah-led government had full discrection on social, economic, and political issues. 
Privatized sectors, including telecommunications, were handed to monoplies. 
 
During that lifetime, Paltel were given a wired and wirelss telecommunications license with 
exlusivity until 2006 for fixed communications and 2004 for mobile communications. The PA 
was a major shareholder at the beginning, but it sold most of its shares. It still have around 6% of 
shares to date, as Paltel indicated in the interview. 
 
In 2003, political reform started. A constitution was adopted and the Prime Minister position was 
introduced. In 2005 current president of the PA, Abbas was elected and new parleminatary 
elections were due in 2006.   
 
                                                 
11 There have been two incidents in the past year related to media, where telecommunication sector was caught in 
between. Both incidents involved the District Attorney ordering Internet Service Providers to block access to certain 
websites based on political reasons. In both incidents the DA completely disregarded the judicial system and 
presidential order with regard to blocking websites. 
12 The Oslo agreement or deceleration of principles is the first agreement between Israel and PLO. According to the 
declaration and following agreements (Oslo II, Wye River), Israel will gradually pull out of Palestinian territories in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip until a final peace settlement, based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 is reached out by 
2000
12. A Palestinian Authority (PA) will be established in place of the Israeli civil administration. 
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 The dual-party timeframe was a result of Hamas decision to participate in the 2006 parlementray 
elsections. Hamas won with a comfortable majority, gained control over the legislative council 
and formed the government. This resulted in conflicting political agendas between the President 
(Fatah) and the Prime Minister ( Hamas). Number of laws, including the 2006 
telecommunications law were rejected by the legislative council as a result of this conflict. 
 
In early 2007 political struggle resulted in a political split where Hamas took full control over 
Gaza Strip and established a Hamas-based government, while Fatah controlld the West Bank and 
established a “technocrat” government supported by Fatah, for the most part. In both areas, 
goverments have greater discrection and almost nonexistent formal restraints, eventhough some 




Recently, there have been formal talks for a reunion and new presidential and parlemintary 
elections, with both governments resigning and a unified government appointed by the PA 
President to preapre for new elections. 
 
Effect on telecommunications 
 
A. First timeframe (1996-2003) 
During the first timeframe, the PA decided to privitaze the sector after shortime of managing it 
through the ministry of telecommunications and post. Privitization process reulted in awarding 
Paltel with a license to exlusively operate the wired network for 10 years (1996-2006) and to 
develop the netwrok for 20 years (1996-2016). Paltel also got an exlusive mobile license to its 
subsidiary Jawwal for 5 years (1999-2004) or 120,000 subscribers, whichever comes first. 
 
According to World Bank (2011), PA’s decision to privitize the sector and to award Paltel with a 
statutory monopoly was sound and rational considering the high risk of operating in politically 
unstable reagion. However, proceedings by which Paltel was awarded the license raised doubts. 
First, before awarding Paltel its exlusivety license, the PA had reached an agreement with 
another company to award it with a teleommunications license. The PA then revoked the license. 
Second, there was no formal tendering process in both cases. Finally, the license and its annexes 
were kept private until 2008, where the ministry itself did not have a copy. (World Bank, 2011, 
page 35) In a recent interview, current minister of telecommunications said that the ministry’s 




During the same time, PA President singed the 1996 Telecommunicaion Law
15 (Palestinian 
Authority, 1996), where Ministry of Telecommunications and Post became the entituy 
responsible for policy making and sector regulation. 
                                                 
13 In West Bank, laws are drafted by legal committees then approved by the cabinet and signed by the President as 
emergency laws. They become effective once they are signed, but they are still in need to be passed by the 
Legislative Council when it resumes its operations in the future. In Gaza Strip, the government has revived the 
Legislative Council, but it is composed of Hamas members living in Gaza Strip. 
14 http://maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=410486 
15 The law was signed before establishing the Palestinian Legislative Council 
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Relationship between the ministry and Paltel went smooth for the most part. A friendly 
politician-business relationship could be observed here as mentioned in Levy and Spiller’s 
framework. ISOC, CoolNet and other stakeholders have pointed to such a relationship, where 
almost all decisions went Paltel’s way. 
 
B. Second timeframe (2003-2007) 
There has been a dramatic change in the political scene that affected the sctor. First, the leading 
party Fatah witnessed internal conflict that resulted in enacting a constitution, introducing the 
prime minister position and announcing of new elections to be held in 2006. Second, Hamas 
participation in the parlementary elections changed the political layout. It’s majority government 
ensured, for the first time, that restraints on regulatory discretion would be possible, even for the 
wrong reasons. 
 
That’s what happened when calls to reform the teleocmmunicaions sector that started in 2003 
resulted in a new telecommunicaions law (Palestinian Authority, 2006) that supports liberlization 
of the market in 2006. The President of the PA signed the law. However, the legislative Council 
rejected that law, among other laws, as signs of political tension between the two major parties 
started to surface. Putting things into context, the move of the Legislative Council was more of a 
political vendetta rather than exercising a healty restraint action against the exuctive. ISOC is in 
line of this interpretation, as they were one of the main bodies pushing for the 2006 law. ISOC 
explains that “Part of it [rejection of the law] was the new majority party rejected everything the 
president has done.”  
 
Nonetheless, under this government, Wataniya was awarded the 2
nd mobile license, where the 
PA through Palestine Investment Fund was a major shareholder with 30% of total shares, which 
is a source of concern to Paltel, as they have indicated in the interview. Also, Wataniya awarded 
large contracts for advertising activities to a company owned by the President’s son. Again, these 
acts are aligned with the “political investment cycles” hypothesis.  
 
C. Third timeframe (2007-Present) 
After the political split, a Hamas government gained full control over Gaza Strip, while a Fatah-
supported technocrat government gained control over the West Bank. Both governments have 
full discretion and nonexistent formal restraints on their decisions. The difference though, in 
West Bank, is that unlike the first timeframe, partial liberalization has been achieved, where a 2
nd 
mobile operator Wataniya is competing with Jawwal, and several small companies were licensed 
to offer voice and data telecommunications services and compete with Paltel. The West Bank 
government has started a series of steps to strengthen market liberalization starting with 
introducing the 2009 Telecommunications Law (Palestinian Authority, 2009) that establishes an 
independent regulatory authority and strengthens competition in the market. Also, introducing 
the bit stream access model and licensing operator(s) to provide telecommunications services 
through power lines were of the major highlights. In addition, the ministry has engaged in 
negotiations with Paltel, which resulted in an agreement of functional separation between voice, 
mobile, and Internet divisions in exchange for a 3G spectrum license. The situation resembles, to 
some extent, Stirton & Lodge (2002) explination of Jamaica. 
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 Events that took place during the three timeframes, resemble those of the Philippines, where a 
fully functioning regulatory governance structure has not put in place. In addition, development 
of the telecommunications sector can be cahractirized by a “political investment cycle”, where 
investment by Paltel varied from high investment period during the first timeframe into a low 




Bureaucracy in the PA suffers from several inefficiencies that render its performance as weak. 
One main source of inefficiencies is the low level of expertise especially in policymaking and 
technical issues. Another source is corruption and weak enforcement of the law. 
 
With regard to the low level of expertise, Palestine has a small skilled labor base, where both 
private and public sectors compete to attract. According to the MTIT’s deputy minister, the 
ministry offers around 10% of salaries offered by the private sector. This put an immense 
pressure on the ministry to attract skilled workers. To compensate this, the ministry supports its 
staff with training programs and links its members with international agencies such as ITU. 
However, this means that the ministry would take too much time in keeping up with market 
developments. 
 
For example, the ministry declared that pricing of telecommunications services in future ROIs 
will be based on LRIC starting April 2010. Until now, LRIC estimations are not ready, and 
although Paltel have submitted their LRIC-based prices, the ministry was unable to verify those 
figures. Stakeholders consider this to be a problem. For example, Paltel recognizes that although 
there have been improvements, the ministry’s resources are limited, and this hinders its ability to 
upgrade their staff skills.  
 
“At the end, any operator in the world would like the regulator to be informed and 
professional. For example, when we talk about costing, it is extremely important when 
we talk we understand each other and use the same terminologies. However, they do have 
their limits in terms of resources and finances and their expertise. They are trying to 
improve, but you cannot do this in short time.” 
 
The same problem is found in other ministries and governmental agencies. While the PA had put 
in place several programs to develop and train its bureaucracy, in general it remains weak and 
unskilled. 
 
                                                 
16 http://maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=410486. The current telecommunications Minister have declared 
recently that Paltel has to increase its investment, especially in NGN before both parties sit down for license 
extension negotiations in 2015. 
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 With regard to corruption, International Transparency’s Corruption Perceptions Index
17 does not 
include information on Palestine’s public sector corruption. However, Transparency-Palestine
18 
has issued several reports addressing corruption in public sector. Also, the World Bank (2011) 
has published its report on enhancing governance and reducing corruption. Both organizations 
suggest that nepotism is the main source of corruption in Palestine. 
 
With regard to enforcement agencies, corruption and weak rule of law result in a process of 
selective enforcement, where some court orders are neglected, while others are enforced mainly 
because of political reasons. Violation of the rule of law is not uncommon. Within 
telecommunications, practices such as call tapping and websites blocking are among the most 
common violations by security agencies. Although there has been a presidential order that 
prohibits such practices, they still occur, albeit in smaller frequency. While such practices can be 
found elsewhere, the real uncertainty comes from the fact that court orders specific to 
telecommunications disputes might be overlooked by enforcement agencies. 
 
4.4	Regulatory	commitment	
Reflecting on its institutional framework, Palestine’s regulatory system can be categorized as a 
“Presidential rent-seeking” with a “political investment cycle.” This description matches levy 
and spiller’s framework for weak capacity countries. The following table shows the regulatory 
history and commitment. 
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17 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 
18 http://www.aman-palestine.org/eng/index.htm 
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Section 4 illustrated Palestine’s institutional endowment, which resembles Argentina and the 
Philippines’. However, there are two important factors needed to be addressed in the case of 
Palestine. First, the Israeli control of telecommunications resources, and second; PA’s 
institutional capacity building efforts. 
 
5.1  Israeli	control	over	vital	telecommunications	resources	
One major concern for investors is the degree of power and control Israeli occupying forces have 
over some vital telecommunications resources. This control is the result of Oslo agreement in 
1995, which in its economic annex stated that the PA has the right to build a telecommunications 
network in areas under its control (areas A and B defined by the agreement), while other matters 
such as international gateway, importing equipment, access to area C, and spectrum shall be kept 
under the Israeli control. Such matters proved to be critical. 
 
With regard to international gateway, although the PA got its own international dialing code 
number (970), in does not have an independent international gateway, and is not permitted to use 
any international gateway other than the Israeli one. In effect, it doesn’t matter for a caller in the 
US, for example, to use Palestine’s (970) or Israeli (972) code to get through and connect to 
either a fixed or mobile Palestinian number. Inability of using its own international gateway or 
negotiate with other neighboring countries, such as Jordan or Egypt put Palestinian operators at 
disadvantage as Israeli operators gained a bargaining power over international traffic, which 
resulted in higher cost for Palestinian operators and higher prices for consumers. 
 
Importing equipment is also under Israeli control, and over the last 15 years Palestinian operators 
suffered from Israeli authorities’ continuous refusal to allow for some equipment to enter the 
Palestinian market, which affected their ability to maintain their networks. Also, most of Paltel 
and Wataniya core network is hosted outside Palestine. Paltel main switches are hosted in 
London, England, which adds around US$ 5 million to the cost of supplying telecommunications 
services. Likewise, Wataniya main switches are hosted in West Jerusalem. 
 
With regard to access to area C, Palestinian operators have to get authorization from Israeli 
authorities to install its equipment in order to serve communities living there. This is not always 
easy, which results in low quality of telecommunications services. Main problem of area C 
territories is mobile. Due to limited number of antennas installed in area C, reception of Jawwal 
and Wataniya signals is weak. With the presence of 4 unlicensed Israeli operators that have better 
coverage in area C and equivalent coverage in area B, a considerable market share (20-40%) is 
lost. 
 
While operators can overcome the above problems with good marketing and product 
differentiation plans, the real problem is spectrum. In both occasions, when the PA licensed 
Jawwal in 1997 and Wataniya in 2006, both companies had to wait for 2-3 years until Israel 
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 agreed to assign spectrum frequency. 
 
For the case of Wataniya, only international and diplomatic pressure on Israel made it release the 
spectrum as Tony Blair used his diplomatic position at the Quartet’s special envoy to pressure 
Israeli authorities into releasing frequenceis
19. Shortly after, Israel release 2G frequencies and 
Wataniya started offering its services in WestBank only, even though 3G services are not yet 
available. Currently MTIT is in negotiations with the Israeli authorities to allow Wataniya to 
operate in Gaza and to release 3G spectrum for both Jawwal and Wataniya. 
 
Without international pressure, Wataniya project would have failed. Any future investor for the 
planned 3
rd mobile operator would not be motivated to enter the market with such Israeli’s 
control. Since management of spectrium will not be under Palesinian control before a final 
settlement between Israel and Palestinian Authority is reached, international gurantee is critical 
and becomes one of the institutional exogenous elements that firms look for. 
 
5.2  Institutional	capacity	building	
Taking Stirton & Lodge (2002) under consideration, changes on overall governing system since 
2006 (or even as early as 2003) should provide an alternative explination or addition to the 
framework. 
 
Reform in governance and political environment has its implications on regulatory reform and 
performance. Events of 2003 and 2006 discussd in section 4.2 brought up governments with far 
more experience and competence than previous years. Emphais on fighting corruption and 
imroving government performance and effeincy started to be heard more often. Hamas built its 
election campaign on fighting corruption, while Fatah promised of internal reform and control of 
corruption. 
 
Although political conflict between Fatah and Hamas negatively affected the political process 
and reform, and eventually led to two governments with greater discretion, topics such as 
corruption of politicians and government were no longer treated as taboo. Several civil society 
organizations, Amman-Palestine being the most vocal, were formed and started to issue 
periodical reports on the state of corruption, nepotism, unauthorized public spending, etc. 
 
After the political split up, the Fatah-supported technocrat government in West Bank published 
its 2-year plan, which aims to eliminate corruption and decrease ineffectiveness in public sector 
as a prerequisite to establishing an independent Palestinian state. To achieve those objectives, the 
plan focuses on institutional development, where such institutions would be the base for a law-
based system. 
 
However, the problem is that such institutions are being built at slow pace. Influence of 
corruption, especially nepotism can still be traced, and people pushing for reform and 
institutional building face many roadblocks. In his attempt to explain why institutions are not 
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 being developed at an acceptable rate, Brown (2010, page 1) argues that concentration on the 
actions of politicians instead of the results of such actions is a mistake. This is what is 
happeneing in the PA, where the term “Fyyadism”, which referes to the prime minister Salam 
Fayyad, has gained much attention and attached the whole process of capaity and institutional 
building to one person, or at best his team. 
 
Within telecommunications, the same issues seems to be reflecting on how MTIT approaches 
regulatory reform, where most of the inititatives were lead by the last two ministeres. However, 
institutionalizing such activities is also going at a slow pace. While the latest minister has 
brought in a qualified team that has better regulatory experience, such team is still crippled by 
the surrounding environment. The minister himself complained lately, after the website blocking 
incident, that “Dark forces are still working hard.” Even when the latest incident of blocking 
websites was resolved, it was based on individual efforts from the minister, some politicians, and 
the President himself. The DA’s actions went unchallenged, either by the exuctive, legislative or 
judiciary.  
 
Stakeholders did share this explination in one way or another and pointed out that steps taken by 
the ministry so far are not being institutionalized. For example, when asked about the 
transparency of regulatory process, Coolnet implid that there is still struggle within the PA, 
which appeared during deliberations over establishing an independent telecommunications 
regulatory authority. 
 
“I see that what has been written and prepared about the authority was transparent, good, 
and fair, and I suspect that it was the reason behind delaying establishment of the 
authority. Many parties did not anticipate that and the way the authority is designed. They 
suspected they would still have power over it, and because of that the authority has been 
delayed.” 
 
Inability to institutionalize individual initiatives and activities has been expressed by ISOC and 
the expert: For example the expert opinion on MTIT’s expertise in policy making address the gap 
between individual-based and institutional-based actions. 
 
“I think within the last 2 ministers the capacity for policy making at least on an individual 
basis is much better than it was. We have people within the ministry (I am not talking 
about the system per se, but individuals). The institutional know-how, I am not sure how 
can we measure, but the individual know-how we can point to a handful of people who 
have a depth of understanding of regulatory affairs. The goal is how can we take this 
individual know-how and put it in institutional knowledge base.” 
 
 
This is not to say that things have not improved. On the contrary, all stakeholders assert that 
things nowadays are much better than before, and that government’s performance, including 
MTIT’s has improved drastically. Nonetheless, There appears a struggle within the government 
and its agncies on how and if reforms should be carried out. Until such struggle is resolved, 
private sector cannot put its full trust in a risky system. 
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 These lines of events resemble, to some extent, what have happened in Jamaica, a struggle to 
introduce reform including reform of some istitutions. This is currently happeneing in Palestine 
with a major difference. Palestine’s institutinal endowment is not fully developed. Thus such 
struggle is not stable since the environment that is supposed to maintain stability and credibility 
of whatever outcome resulting from such struggle is itself vulnerable. To that extent, relying on 
what seems to be institutions in the making should only be coupled with solid gurantees.   
 
Within such environment, what MTIT is currently pursuing could be described as the best 
possible solution, that is a license-based regulatory system, where each operator or service 
provider protects its investment through a license that clearly defines rights and obligations of 
each player in the market until institutions are fully built, capacity of staff is developed, and a 
complex regulatory sytem can be put in place. 
 
Current experence of MTIT with licensing is encouraging. Although, there is still some notes on 
the way licesning is being handled, with divergence of licenses being the most critical note; 
notntheless, MTIT has worked with several international consultants to produce licenses 
according to best international practices. That’s exactly what happened with Wataniya, as their 




Being small, unstable, and effectively under occupation, the Palestinian Authority faces various 
challenges in the road to effectively manage its resources and regulate its markets, including 
telecommunications. This paper lays down institutional endowment of Palestine based on Levy 
and Spiller’s institutional endowment framework, which proposes that firms’ decision to invest 
in a given country depend on the country’s institutional foundations, mainly its judiciary, 
governance structure, and the competency of its bureaucracy, that are able to put restraints in 
political exploitation. Then, the paper put forward needed adjustments to the framework in order 
to accommodate problems stemming from instability and occupation. 
 
Based on interviews with key stakeholders and examined international reports, the institutional 
endowment of Palestine resembles, for the most part, the one of the Philippines, in which it is a 
“Presidential rent-seeking” aligned with “political investment cycle”, where the PA had vested 
interest in both Paltel and Wataniya. 
 
Examining specifics of Palestine’s institutional foundations shows that judicial system lacks 
independence and experience, governing structure is made up of unified, one-party government 
for the most part of PA’s lifetime, and its bureaucracy is weak and corrupt. During the three 
timeframes of its governing structure, the PA was met with few, if non-existent actions that 
restraint its decisions on telecommunications issues. Accordingly, its regulatory system should be 
based on internationally-guaranteed licensing based system. 
 
MTIT, acting as both policy maker and regulator, moved to such system around 2003. Based on 
PA’s commitment to the World Trade Organization’s Basic Telecommunications Agreement 
(BTA), MTIT issued a 2
nd mobile and several voice and data licenses. Such step marked the start 
of telecommunications liberalization processes and is compliant with Palestine’s institutional 
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 foundations. 
 
However, firms’ decision to invest in Palestine is affected by Israeli control of vital 
telecommunications resources, especially spectrum frequency. Wataniya’s experience provides 
an insight for future plans to introduce new licenses and attract foreign investment. Israeli’s 
refusal to grant Wataniya the needed frequencies has negatively affected investors’ trust. The 
project was about to be declared as a failure after 3 years of waiting and zero revenue. Only 
political pressure via the Quartet’s special envoy prevented such failure and secured minimal 
frequency spectrum that Wataniya needed to start offering its services. Therefore, an 
international guarantee becomes essential as a part of Palestine’s institutional endowment. 
 
PA’s plan to develop its institutions and the recent 2009 Telecommunications Law are seen as a 
right step in the direction of upgrading institutional foundations of Palestine. However, work is 
still in progress and it faces many obstacles as part of hidden conflict between political players. It 
is only when such struggle is over that one can assert to which direction the decision tree 
Palestine should be positioned. Meanwhile, an internationally-guaranteed licensing system 
would still be the most appropriate. 
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